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Abstract
Shimer (2005) argues that the Mortensen-Pissarides (MP) model of unemployment lacks
an ampli￿cation mechanism because it generates less than 10 percent of the observed busi-
ness cycle ￿ uctuations in unemployment given labor productivity shocks of plausible magni-
tude. This paper argues that part of the problem lies with the identi￿cation of productivity
shocks. Because of the endogeneity of measured labor productivity, ￿ltering out the trend
component as in Shimer (2005) may not correctly identify the shocks driving unemploy-
ment. Using a New-Keynesian framework to control for the endogeneity of productivity,
this paper estimates that the MP model can account for a third, and possibly as much as
60 percent, of ￿ uctuations in labor market variables.
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11 Introduction
In a very in￿ uential paper, Shimer (2005) argues that the Mortensen-Pissarides (MP) search
model of unemployment lacks an ampli￿cation mechanism because it generates less than 10
percent of the observed business cycle ￿ uctuations in unemployment given labor productivity
shocks of plausible magnitude. In this paper, I argue that Shimer￿ s (2005) estimate may be
biased downward because of the endogeneity of labor productivity, and I estimate that a third,
and possibly as much as 60 percent, of the Shimer puzzle is simply due to the misidenti￿cation
of productivity shocks.
The Shimer puzzle has attracted a lot of interest in the literature, and a number of re-
searchers have focused on ways to create more ampli￿cation so that small exogenous produc-
tivity movements generate large ￿ uctuations in unemployment.1 However, there is substantial
evidence that, perhaps due to labor hoarding and variable capacity utilization, some of the
movements in productivity are in fact endogenous.2 For example, when the ￿rm is demand
constrained in the short-run, ￿rms can respond to changes in demand by adjusting their level
of capacity utilization of inputs (capital or labor), and measured labor productivity ￿ uctuates
endogenously with aggregate demand and hence unemployment.3 By ￿ltering out the trend
component of output per hour to identify productivity shocks, Shimer (2005) may not identify
the true productivity shocks but rather the endogenous response of productivity to unobserved
disturbances. And because this endogenous response is small, this may explain why the cyclical
component of measured labor productivity ￿ uctuates less than unemployment.
To estimate the impact of exogenous changes in productivity on labor market variables, I
impose long-run restrictions in a structural VAR model along the line of Gali (1999), and I ￿nd
that a permanent productivity increase temporarily lowers labor market tightness (the vacancy-
1See, among others, Hagedorn and Manovski (2005) , Hall (2005), Hall and Migrom (2005), Shimer (2004),
and Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) for a review of recent e⁄orts.
2See, among others, Bils and Cho (1994), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1993), Burnside and Eichen-
baum (1996) and Basu and Kimball (1997).
3This idea is given empirical support in Barnichon (2008), following Gali (1999).
2unemployment ratio), while the MP model implies the opposite.4 Hence, before assessing
the ampli￿cation properties of the MP model, I embed the search and matching model in
a New Keynesian framework. In this set-up, a permanent increase in productivity (i.e. a
positive productivity shock) may temporarily raise unemployment and lower labor market
tightness because aggregate demand does not adjust immediately to the new productivity level
in the presence of nominal rigidities, and hence ￿rms use less labor. The model also generates
endogenous movements in productivity. Because hiring ￿rms are demand constrained, an
aggregate demand shock generates a transitory movement in productivity as ￿rms vary their
level of capacity utilization.
To estimate the proportion of Shimer￿ s puzzle due to the endogeneity of productivity, I use
a calibrated version of the model to control for endogenous productivity movements unrelated
to productivity shocks, and I reproduce Shimer￿ s (2005) exercise on data simulated from my
model. With a standard calibration, simulated labor market tightness is 9 times more volatile
than the cyclical component of labor productivity, while the ratio comes at about 26 in US
data. I conclude that the MP model can account for about a third, rather than 10 percent,
of labor market tightness ￿ uctuations, and a sensitivity analysis suggests that this share could
be as high as 60 percent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses Shimer￿ s (2005)
puzzle; Section 3 presents and calibrates a New-Keynesian model with search unemployment
and replicates Shimer￿ s (2005) exercise on model generated data; and Section 4 o⁄ers some
concluding remarks.
4Barnichon (2008) and Canova, Lopez-Salido and Michelacci (2008) come to similar conclusions, albeit with
di⁄erent labor market variables.
32 The Shimer puzzle
2.1 Shimer￿ s (2005) evidence
In this section, I reproduce Shimer￿ s exercise (2005), and Table 1 presents summary statistics
for unemployment, vacancies, labor market tightness and productivity.5 As originally argued
by Shimer (2005), the volatility of productivity is only a fraction (here less than 4%) of the
volatility of labor market tightness. Turning to the correlation matrix, unemployment and
labor market tightness are weakly correlated with productivity with correlations of respectively
￿0:23 and 0:19.
In the context of a standard MP model where productivity movements are the central
driving force of unemployment ￿ uctuations, Shimer (2005) shows that the standard deviations
of unemployment, vacancies and productivity are of the same order of magnitude, i.e. ￿(u) ￿
￿(v) ￿ ￿(p): By estimating that productivity shocks are only 10% as volatile as unemployment
￿ uctuations, Shimer (2005) concludes that the MP model can only account for less than 10%
of unemployment ￿ uctuations. Furthermore, Shimer (2005) notes that the MP model exhibits
virtually no propagation as it implies a contemporaneous correlation between unemployment
and productivity of ￿1 when the data show a contemporaneous and peak unemployment-
productivity correlation of respectively only ￿0:23 and ￿0:50.
2.2 Fixing the model to add more ampli￿cation
One way to reconcile the MP framework with the data is to modify the model so that it
generates more ampli￿cation, i.e. that a given shock to productivity has a larger impact
5I use quarterly data taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) covering the period 1951:Q1
to 2005:Q4. Labor productivity is measured as real average output per hour in the non-farm business sector,
and unemployment is the quarterly average of the monthly unemployment rate series constructed by the BLS
from the Current Population Survey. Labor market tightness is de￿ned as the vacancy-unemployment ratio and
vacancies are the quarterly average of the monthly Conference Board help-wanted advertising index. I remove
low-frequency movements using a standard HP-￿lter with ￿ = 1600. Alternatively, using ￿ = 10
5 as in Shimer
(2005a) does not change any of the results presented in this paper.
I measure productivity as output per hour as in Shimer (2004) instead of output of worker as in Shimer
(2005). The Shimer puzzle is present with the same magnitude using both measures, and all the results in this
paper hold for both measures.
4on unemployment. Mortensen and Nagypal (2006) provide a detailed review of the current
e⁄ort in that direction, and I will only emphasize two in￿ uential examples. A ￿rst possibility,
suggested by Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005), is to introduce real wage rigidity. In the standard
MP model, the Nash bargaining real wage responds so much to movements in productivity
that it e⁄ectively absorbs most of the changes in productivity. As a result, the surplus of the
match responds only weakly to ￿ uctuations in productivity. By introducing a degree of real
wage rigidity, movements in productivity have a more substantial impact on the match surplus,
on the incentives of ￿rms to post vacancies and hence on equilibrium unemployment.
Another possibility, suggested by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2004), does not rely on real
wage rigidity but uses a standard MP model with a di⁄erent calibration than the one used in
Shimer￿ s. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2004) show that when the opportunity cost of employ-
ment is high, the job ￿nding rate becomes very responsive to changes in productivity, and
the MP model can quantitatively account for the magnitude of unemployment ￿ uctuations.
While this approach is di⁄erent from the one proposed by Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005), the
underlying philosophy is the same: one needs to modify the MP model (either its equations
or its calibration) so that the surplus of the match becomes more responsive to changes in
productivity.
2.3 The conditional volatilities of productivity and labor market tightness
The aforementioned literature generally considers productivity movements as exogenous. How-
ever, there is substantial evidence that, perhaps due to labor hoarding and variable capacity
utilization, some of the movements in productivity are in fact endogenous.6
To identify the impact of exogenous changes in productivity, I follow Gal￿ (1999) and
Blanchard and Quah (1989) and impose long-run restrictions in structural VAR models to
identify technological disturbances. Technology shocks are the only shocks with a permanent
impact on productivity, and I interpret transitory productivity movements as variations in
6See, among others, Bils and Cho (1994), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1996) and Basu and Kimball
(1997).























ht is labor productivity de￿ned as output per hours, ￿t the vacancy-unemployment
ratio, C(L) an invertible matrix polynomial and the vector of structural orthogonal innovations
comprises technology shocks "a
t and non-technology shocks "m
t .7
Figure 1 presents the impulse response functions. The Shimer puzzle is clearly apparent
for both shocks: the standard deviation over the ￿rst two years after a technology shock is 16
times larger for labor market tightness than for output per hour, and after a non-technology
shock, the ratio is 21. However, as similarly emphasized in Gali (1999), Barnichon (2008) and
Canova, Lopez-Salido and Michelacci (2008) a positive technology shock temporarily lowers
labor market tightness, while the MP model implies the opposite.8 This implies that it is
di¢ cult to draw conclusions regarding the ampli￿cation properties of the baseline MP model
since its transmission mechanism is likely to be incomplete.
3 The Shimer puzzle in a New-Keynesian setting
To reassess the extent of Shimer￿ s puzzle, it is important to extend the search and matching
model so that it can (i) rationalize endogenous productivity movements, and (ii) account for
the fact that permanent productivity increases temporarily lower labor market tightness. To
do so, I follow Gali (1999) and Barnichon (2008), and I extend the MP model so that hiring
7I use quarterly data taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) covering the period 1951:Q1 to
2005:Q4. Labor productivity xt is measured as real average output per hour in the non-farm business sector, and
labor market tightness ￿t = vt= ut is the ratio of the quarterly average of the monthly unemployment rate series
constructed by the BLS from the Current Population Survey over the Conference Board help advertising index.




t, 1973:Q1 and 1997:Q1, and I ￿lter the unemployment
series with a quadratic trend. Fernald (2007) showed that the presence of a low-frequency correlation between
labor productivity growth and unemployment, while unrelated to cyclical phenomena, could signi￿cantly distort
the estimates of short run responses obtained with long run restrictions.
8See Barnichon (2008) for a discussion about the positive impact of technology shocks on unemployment and
its implications for the modeling of unemployment ￿ uctuations.
6￿rms are demand constrained in a New-Keynesian fashion.
In a neoclassical setting, ￿rms post vacancies depending on the return of the match. How-
ever, this needs not be the case when ￿rms have to satisfy a given level of demand for their
products. In a New-Keynesian setting with monopolistically competitive ￿rms and nominal
rigidities, ￿rms may have to hire more workers when demand is unexpectedly high even if
productivity (and hence the match surplus) does not increase. Put di⁄erently, the number of
posted vacancies could increase without any change in productivity. In practice, ￿rms also
respond to higher demand by increasing capacity utilization of inputs (capital or labor). As
a result, measured labor productivity ￿ uctuates with aggregate demand and hence unemploy-
ment.
A permanent increase in productivity (i.e. a technology shock) may temporarily raise
unemployment because with nominal rigidities, aggregate demand does not adjust immediately
to the new productivity level, and ￿rms use less labor.
In the next subsections, I present and calibrate a New-Keynesian model with search unem-
ployment, and I replicate Shimer￿ s exercise on model generated data.
3.1 A New-Keynesian model with search unemployment
Following Barnichon (2008) and Krause and Lubik (2007), I extend the MP model by introduc-
ing nominal frictions so that hiring ￿rms are demand constrained in a New-Keynesian fashion.
In addition, I make a distinction between the extensive (number of workers) and the intensive
(hours and e⁄ort) labor margins. In this framework, unemployment ￿ uctuations are the prod-
uct of two disturbances: technology shocks and monetary policy (or aggregate demand) shocks.
A positive technology shock permanently raises productivity but may also temporarily raise
unemployment and lower labor market tightness. A positive monetary policy shock decreases
unemployment and increases measured productivity temporarily, because ￿rms increase labor
e⁄ort to satisfy demand in the short run. As a result, measured labor productivity is the
product of two components: permanent and temporary disturbances.
7The main ingredients of the model are monopolistic competition in the goods market,
hiring frictions in the labor market and nominal price rigidities. There are three types of
agents: households, ￿rms and a monetary authority.
3.1.1 Households
I consider an economy populated by a continuum of households of measure one and a continuum
of ￿rms of measure one. With equilibrium unemployment, ex-ante homogenous workers become
heterogeneous in the absence of perfect income insurance because each individual￿ s wealth
di⁄ers based on his employment history. To avoid distributional issues, I follow Merz (1995) and
Andolfatto (1996) in assuming that households form an extended family that pools its income
and chooses per capita consumption and assets holding to maximize its expected lifetime utility.
There are 1 ￿ nt unemployed workers who receive unemployment bene￿ts b in units of utility
of consumption, and nt employed workers who receive the wage payment wit from ￿rm i for
providing hours hit and e⁄ort per hour eit.9 Denoting g(hit;eit) the individual disutility from














subject to the budget constraint
Z 1
0
PjtCjtdj + Mt =
Z 1
0
ntwitdi + (1 ￿ nt)bCt + ￿t + Mt￿1
with ￿m a positive constant, Mt nominal money holdings, ￿t total transfers to the family and









where Cit is the
quantity of good i 2 [0;1] consumed in period t and Pit is the price of variety i: " > 1 is the
elasticity of substitution among consumption goods. The aggregate price level is de￿ned as












. The disutility from supplying hours of work ht and e⁄ort per hour et is
the sum of the disutilities of the members who are employed. Following Bils and Cho (1994),











where ￿h; ￿e; ￿h and ￿e are positive constants. The last term re￿ ects disutility from exerting
e⁄ort with the marginal disutility of e⁄ort per hour rising with the number of hours. An
in￿nite value for ￿e generates the standard case with inelastic e⁄ort.
3.1.2 Firms and the labor market
Each di⁄erentiated good is produced by a monopolistically competitive ￿rm using labor as the
only input. There is a continuum of large ￿rms distributed on the unit interval. At date t,
each ￿rm i hires nit workers to produce a quantity yit = AtnitL￿
it where At is an aggregate
technology index, Lit the e⁄ective labor input supplied by each worker and 0 < ￿ < 1.10 I de￿ne
e⁄ective labor input as a function of hours hit and e⁄ort per hour eit such that Lit = hiteit.
Total e⁄ective labor input can be adjusted through three channels: the extensive margin nit,
and the two intensive margins: hours hit and e⁄ort per hour eit. With variable e⁄ort, the
model will be able to generate endogenous procyclical movements in productivity.
Being a monopolistic producer, the ￿rm faces a downward sloping demand curve yd
it =
(Pit
Pt )￿"Yt and chooses its price Pit to maximize its value function given the aggregate price
level Pt and aggregate output Yt. As is standard in New-Keynesian models, ￿rms are subject
to Calvo-type price setting and can only reset their price at random dates. Each period a
fraction ￿ of randomly selected ￿rms cannot reset its price.
10This production function can be rationalized by assuming a constant capital-worker ratio and a standard
Cobb-Douglas production function yit = At (nLit)
￿ K
1￿￿
it . Note however, that the main message of the paper
does not rely on this particular choice of the production function, and that the model could accommodate other
functional forms.
9In a search and matching model of the labor market, workers cannot be hired instanta-
neously and must be hired from the unemployment pool through a costly and time-consuming
job creation process. Firms post vacancies at a unitary cost, ct = cAt, and unemployed workers
search for jobs. I assume that the matching function takes the usual Cobb-Douglas form so




t where m0 is
a positive constant, ￿ 2 (0;1), ut denotes the number of unemployed and vt=
R 1
0 vitdi the total
number of vacancies posted by all ￿rms. Accordingly, the probability of a vacancy being ￿lled
in the next period is q(￿t) ￿ m(ut;vt)=vt = m0￿￿￿ where ￿t ￿ vt
ut is the labor market tightness.
Similarly, the probability for an unemployed to ￿nd a job is m(ut;vt)=ut = m0￿
1￿￿
t . Matches
are destroyed at a constant rate ￿, and the law of motion for a representative ￿rm is given by
nit+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)nit + q(￿t)vi;t.
When a ￿rm and a worker meet, they must decide on the allocation of hours and e⁄ort to
satisfy demand. I assume that both parties negotiate the hours/e⁄ort decision by choosing the
optimal allocation and set hours and e⁄ort per hour to satisfy demand at the lowest utility












subject to satisfying demand Atnith￿
ite￿
it = yd
it at date t, and this implies that e⁄ort per hour












1+￿e is a positive constant. Thus, changes in hours can proxy for changes




10with y0 = e￿






. For ’ > 1, the production function displays short
run increasing returns to hours, and endogenous labor productivity (i.e. output per hour)
movements are procyclical.
3.1.3 Wage bill setting
As is usual in the search literature, ￿rms and workers bargain individually about the real wage
and split the surplus in shares determined by an exogenous bargaining weight ￿. Denoting
Ji(wit) the value of a matched worker to ￿rm i at date t, and Wi(wit) and U(wit) the value
for a worker of being respectively employed by ￿rm i and unemployed, the equilibrium wage


























with ￿t = 1




￿t + (1 ￿ ￿)
bt
￿t













3.1.4 The ￿rm￿ s problem
Given the market wage and aggregate price level, ￿rm i will choose a sequence of price fPitg
and vacancies fvitg to maximize the expected present discounted value of future pro￿ts subject
11While the wage equation (1) is a weighted average of both parties surpluses and is similar to other bargained
wages derived in e.g. Trigari (2004), Walsh (2004) or Krause and Lubik (2007), the ￿rm￿ s surplus is not given
by the marginal product of labor. Indeed, once the ￿rm has chosen its price, it is demand constrained and a







the change in the wage bill caused by substituting the intensive margin (hours and e⁄ort) with the extensive
one (employment). See Barnichon (2008) for more details.
12The model is well behaved only if { > 0. This imposes that 1 ￿
￿
’ (1 + ￿h) > 0, which will be veri￿ed by
the calibrated parameters.
11to the demand constraint, the Calvo price setting rule, the hours/e⁄ort choice and the law of























the law of motion for employment
nit+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)nit + q(￿t)vit
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3.1.5 Technological progress and the central bank
Consistent with the long run identifying assumption made in Section 2, the technology in-
dex series is non-stationary with a unit root originating in technological innovations. Hence,
technology is comprised of a deterministic and a stochastic component: At = ea:t+at with
at = at￿1 + "a
t and "a
t ￿ N(0;￿a) is a technology shock with a permanent impact on produc-
tivity.
Consistent with a growing economy and zero in￿ ation in ￿steady-state￿ , the money supply
evolves according to Mt = ea:t+mt with ￿mt = ￿m￿mt￿1 + "m
t + ￿cb"a
t, ￿m 2 [0;1] and
"m
t ￿ N(0;￿m): I interpret "m
t as an aggregate demand shock.
123.1.6 Closing and solving the model
Averaging ￿rms￿employment, total employment evolves according to nt+1 = (1￿￿)nt+vtq(￿t):
The labor force being normalized to one, the number of unemployed workers is ut = 1 ￿ nt.
Finally, as in Krause and Lubik (2007), vacancy posting costs are distributed to the aggregate
households so that Ct = Yt in equilibrium. To solve the model, I log-linearize the ￿rst-order
conditions around the (zero-in￿ ation) long run equilibrium.13
3.2 Calibration
I now discuss the calibration of the parameters of the model, and Table 2 lists the parameter
values. Whenever possible, I use values typically used in the literature. I set the quarterly
discount factor ￿ to 0:99 and the returns to e¢ cient labor ￿ to 0:64: I assume that the markup
of prices over marginal costs is on average 10 percent, which amounts to setting " equal to 11. I
choose ￿ = 0:5 so that ￿rms reset their price every 2 quarters, consistent with Bils and Klenow
(2004). I set the growth rate of technology (and money supply) to a = 0:5% a quarter so that
the economy is growing by 2% on average each year. I use a money growth autocorrelation
parameter ￿m of 0:5 following Krause and Lubik (2007). Turning to the labor market, I use a
middle value for the matching function elasticity ￿ = 0:5 and set the bargaining weight ￿ = ￿
following the Hosios (1990) condition. The scale parameter of the matching functions m0 is
chosen such that, as reported in den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000), a ￿rm ￿lls a vacancy
with a quarterly probability q(￿) = 0:7 and, as used in Thomas (2008), a worker ￿nds a job
with probability ￿q(￿) = 0:6. Following Shimer (2005), the separation rate is 10% so jobs last
for about 2.5 years on average, and the income replacement ratio is set to 40%. I choose ￿h = 2
(i.e. an hours per worker elasticity of 0:5) and need to decide on ￿e to ￿x a value for ’. Bils
and Cho (1994) build a model to account for the procyclicality of labor productivity. In doing
so, they allow for variable e⁄ort and variable capital utilization. The present model does not
consider capital explicitly but implicitly if one assumes a constant capital-labor ratio. A key
13The equations are presented in the Appendix.
13hypothesis of Bils and Cho (1994) is that the capital utilization rate is proportional to hours.
If a worker works longer hours and at a more intense pace, the utilization of the capital he
operates will also tend to increase. As a result, changes in hours per worker proxy not only for
variations in e⁄ort but also for unobserved changes in capital utilization. In that case, Schor￿ s
(1997) estimate for the elasticity of e⁄ort with respect to hours
￿h
1+￿e = 0:5 delivers a value
for ’ of 1:5. I set ￿e accordingly in order to match this estimate.14 Finally, and consistent
with the aim of the paper to reassess Shimer￿ s puzzle while controlling for the endogeneity of
productivity, I set the standard deviations of technology and monetary policy shocks ￿a and
￿m equal to the standard deviations of technology and non-technology shocks estimated with
the structural VAR.15
3.3 Simulation
Figure 2 and 3 show the impulse response functions after technology shocks and monetary
policy (or aggregate demand) shocks. A ￿rst observation is that this New Keynesian MP model
ful￿lls the two necessary conditions to reassess Shimer￿ s puzzle: it is successful at replicating
the productivity responses to both shocks (or put di⁄erently, it can be used to control for the
endogeneity of productivity), and it gets the sign of labor market tightness responses right.
Nonetheless, the Shimer puzzle is apparent after both shocks: model labor market tightness
moves a lot less than its empirical counterpart.
However, after a non-technology shock, the standard deviation of model labor market
tightness over the ￿rst two years after a technology shock is almost 9 times larger than for
model output per hour. Since the empirical ratio is 21, the MP model explains in fact 40%
of labor market tightness ￿ uctuations following an aggregate demand shock. This back-of-
the-envelope calculation suggests that the misidenti￿cation of productivity shocks and the
endogeneity of productivity may be responsible for some of the Shimer puzzle.
Using a calibrated version of the model, I simulate 50 years of data, and I repeat the exercise
14This calibration is consistent with Basu and Kimball (1997) evidence that ’ ranges between 1:28 to 1:6.
15With this calibration, the model matches the persistence and volatility of the US output per hour series.
145000 times. Following Shimer (2005), I detrend the model generated productivity series, and
in Table 2, I report the summary statistics for the simulated labor market variables. Despite
a baseline Mortensen-Pissarides structure of the labor market and a standard calibration,
simulated ￿ is 9 times more volatile than the cyclical component of labor productivity, while
the ratio comes at about 26 in US data. I conclude that the MP model can account for about
a third, rather than 10 percent, of labor market tightness ￿ uctuations.
In other dimensions, the model performs remarkably well as the cross-correlations have the
right signs and are not far o⁄ the true values. In particular, unemployment is only weakly cor-
related with productivity (￿0:24) and matches quite closely its empirical counterpart (￿0:23).
However, the autocorrelation of model vacancies is 0:42 instead of 0:90 for US data. This is
due to the excessively rapid response of vacancies. This problem was already pointed out by
Fujita and Ramey (2004) and incorporating sunk costs for vacancy creation as in Fujita and
Ramey (2004) would presumably correct this shortcoming. Similarly, this excess sensitivity of
vacancies can explain the slightly too high vacancy-productivity and labor market tightness-
productivity correlations (both 0:49, compared with empirical values of 0:25 and 0:19).
3.4 Robustness
Since the main result of this paper comes out of a calibration exercise, I present in Table 4 the
in￿ uence of key parameters on the ability of the extended MP model to generate ￿ uctuations
in labor market variables. First, I span the range of plausible values for the elasticity of the
matching function from ￿ = 0:24 (Hall, 2005) to 0:72 (Shimer, 2005) and ￿nd that the MP
model explains between roughly 25 and 50 percent of ￿ uctuations in ￿.16 The return to hours
coe¢ cient is also an important parameter, and Basu and Kimball (1998) estimates that it
ranges between 1:3 and 1:6. Within this interval, the MP model accounts for between 30 and
60 percent of unemployment ￿ uctuations. With a higher degree of price stickiness (one year),
16It is important to note that the elasticity of the matching function has a large impact on the performance
of the New Keynesian MP model. However, Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) show that this is not the case for
the baseline MP model: a value ￿ = 0:44 instead of ￿ = 0:72 barely changes the elasticity of market tightness
with respect to productivity and does not help to overturn Shimer￿ s conclusion.
15the MP model accounts for almost 50% of ￿ uctuations in ￿. Finally, varying the value of the
income replacement ratio from 0:4 (Shimer, 2005) to the high value used in Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2005) of b = 0:9 improves the "ampli￿cation properties" of the New Keynesian
MP model so much that it generates too much volatility in ￿: Similarly, lowering the worker￿ s
bargaining weight improves the performance of the MP model, and a low value ￿ = 0:05 as
in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005) allows the MP model to account for 40% of labor market
tightness ￿ uctuations.17
4 Conclusion
In a very important paper, Shimer (2005) argues that the Mortensen-Pissarides search model
of unemployment lacks an ampli￿cation mechanism because it cannot generate the observed
business cycle ￿ uctuations in unemployment given labor productivity shocks of plausible mag-
nitude.
In this paper, I show that because of the endogeneity of measured labor productivity, ￿lter-
ing out the trend component of output per hour as in Shimer (2005) may not correctly identify
the shocks driving unemployment. In fact, using long-run restrictions in a structural VAR
model to isolate exogenous productivity shocks, I ￿nd that a permanent increase in productiv-
ity lowers the vacancy-unemployment ratio, while the MP model implies the opposite. I embed
the MP model in a New-Keynesian framework to (i) account for this empirical evidence, and
(ii) control for the endogeneity of productivity, and I estimate that the MP model can account
for a third, and possibly as much as 60 percent, of ￿ uctuations in labor market variables.
Interestingly, this ￿nding is in line with the work by Pissarides (2007) who reconsiders the
Shimer puzzle in the context of an MP model with endogenous job destruction. Pissarides
(2007) reestimates the unemployment volatility puzzle downwards and claims that ￿with en-
dogenous job destruction, the model fails to account for about half to two thirds of the volatility
17Interestingly, this implies that Hagedorn and Manovskii￿ s (2005) calibration with a high income replacement
ratio and low worker￿ s bargaining weight generates too much volatility in ￿.
16in unemployment￿instead of the 90% originally estimated by Shimer (2005). If a third of the
Shimer puzzle is due to the misidenti￿cation of productivity shocks and another 30 to 50 per-
cent is due to the omission of endogenous job destruction, the low volatility of unemployment
relative to that of productivity may be less of a problem than originally thought.
17Appendix
Log-linearized equilibrium dynamics
To analyze the behavior of the economy, I log-linearize the ￿rst-order conditions around the
(zero-in￿ ation) long run equilibrium.











with ￿it, the shadow value of a marginal worker, given by








q(￿t) is the expected duration of a vacancy, equation (3) has the usual interpretation:
each ￿rm posts vacancies until the expected cost of hiring a worker ct





j=1 from an extra worker. Because the ￿rm is demand
constrained, the ￿ ow value of a marginal worker is not his contribution to revenue but his
reduction of the ￿rm￿ s wage bill. The ￿rst term of ￿it is the wage payment going to an extra
worker, while the second term represents the savings due to the decrease in hours and e⁄ort
achieved with that extra worker.
Log-linearizing the vacancy posting condition equation around the (zero-in￿ ation) steady
state, I get for any t > 0
c￿
q(￿￿)







with the value of a marginal worker ^ ￿it+1 given by






￿ 1)(^ yit+1 ￿ ^ nit+1)
18With Calvo-type price setting, a ￿rm resetting its price at date t will satisfy the standard













where the optimal mark-up is ￿ = "










The ￿rm will choose a price P￿
it that is, in expected terms, a constant mark-up ￿ over its real
marginal cost for the expected lifetime of the price.
To derive the New-Keynesian Phillips curve, I log-linearize around the zero in￿ ation equilib-
rium. However, because of ￿rms￿ex-post heterogeneity, the derivation is not as straightforward
as with costly price adjustment. I follow Woodford￿ s (2004) similar treatment of endogenous
capital in a New-Keynesian model with Calvo price rigidity. In my case, employment is the





t [~ pit+k ￿ ^ sit+k] = 0 (4)
with
^ sit+k = ^ nit+k +
1 + ￿h
’
(^ yit+k ￿ ^ nit+k) ￿ ^ yit+k + ^ yt+k (5)
The notation ^ Ei
t denotes an expectation conditional on the state of the world at date t but






is the ￿rm￿ s relative price.
Denoting log prices by lower-case letters and p￿
it the optimal (log) price for ￿rm i at t, the
demand curve for ￿rm i at date t + 1 can be written ^ yit+1 = ^ yt+1 ￿ "(pit ￿ pt+1) if it cannot
reset its price at t + 1 and ^ yit+1 = ^ yt+1 ￿ "(p￿
it+1 ￿ pt+1) if it can reset its price.
19Averaging across all ￿rms, I get
1 Z
0












= ^ yt+1 ￿ "
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it+1di is the average price chosen by all price setters at date t + 1.





















Log-linearizing around the zero-in￿ ation equilibrium gives ￿￿(pt+1￿pt) = (1￿￿)(p￿
t+1￿pt+1)
and combining with (6) gives
1 Z
0
^ yit+1di = ^ yt+1. Further,
1 Z
0
^ nitdi = ^ nt.
Averaging (5) across all ￿rms, I can rewrite the real marginal cost as






(￿"~ pit+k ￿ ~ nit+k) (7)
where ~ nit+k = nit+k ￿ nt+k is the relative employment of ￿rm i.
Using that ^ Ei
































20Moreover, subtracting (??) from its average, I get
~ nit+1 = Et(^ yit+1 ￿ ^ yt+1) (9)
= ￿"Et
￿
￿(pit ￿ pt+1) + (1 ￿ ￿)(p￿
it+1 ￿ pt+1
￿
= ￿"￿~ pit ￿ "(1 ￿ ￿)(p￿
it+1 ￿ p￿
t+1)
since pt+1 = ￿pt + (1 ￿ ￿)p￿
t+1.
The ￿rm￿ s pricing decision depends on its employment level and the economy￿ s aggregate state.
But to a ￿rst order, the log-linearized equations are linear so that the di⁄erence between p￿
it and
p￿
t, the average price chosen by all price setters, is independent from the economy￿ s aggregate
state and depends only on the relative level of employment nit ￿ nt = ~ nit. So as in Woodford
(2004), I guess that the ￿rm￿ s pricing decision takes the form
p￿
it ￿ p￿
t = ￿￿~ nit (10)
with ￿ a constant to be determined. Hence, (9) becomes
~ nit+1 =
￿"￿
1 ￿ "(1 ￿ ￿)￿
~ pit = ￿f(￿)~ pit
Since this was shown for any t > 0, I also get ~ nit+k = ￿f(￿)~ pit+k￿1, 8k > 0 so that I can
rewrite (8) as
￿p￿







































Subtracting (11) from its average, I obtain
￿(p￿
it ￿ p￿
























Finally, averaging (11) and using ￿t = 1￿￿
￿ (p￿
t ￿pt), I obtain the New-Keynesian Phillips curve





[1] Andolfatto, D. ￿Business Cycles and Labor-Market Search,￿American Economic Review,
86(1), 1996.
[2] Barnichon, R. ￿Productivity, Aggregate Demand and Unemployment Fluctuations,￿Fi-
nance and Economics Discussion Series 2008-47, Board of Governor of the Federal Reserve
System, 2008.
[3] Basu, S. and M. Kimball. ￿Cyclical Productivity with Unobserved Input Variation,￿
NBER Working Papers 5915, 1997.
[4] Bils, M. and J. Cho. ￿Cyclical Factor Utilization,￿Journal of Monetary Economics, 33,
319-354, 1994.
[5] Burnside, C., Eichenbaum, M. ￿Factor-Hoarding and the Propagation of Business-Cycle
Shocks,￿American Economic Review, 86(5), pp. 1154-1174, 1996.
[6] Burnside, C., Eichenbaum, M. and S. Rebelo. ￿Labor Hoarding and the Business Cycle,￿
Journal of Political Economy, 01(2), pp. 245-73, 1993.
[7] Canova, F., C. Michelacci and D. L￿pez-Salido, ￿Schumpeterian Technology Shocks,￿
mimeo CEMFI, 2007.
[8] Fujita, S. and G. Ramey. ￿Job Matching and Propagation,￿Journal of Economic Dynam-
ics and Control, Forthcoming.
[9] Gal￿, J. ￿Technology, Employment and The Business Cycle: Do Technology Shocks Ex-
plain Aggregate Fluctuations?,￿American Economic Review, 89(1), 1999.
[10] Gal￿, J and P. Rabanal. ￿Technology Shocks and Aggregate Fluctuations: How Well Does
the RBC Model Fit Postwar U.S. Data?,￿NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 2004.
23[11] Hagedorn, M. and I. Manovskii. ￿The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment
and Vacancies Revisited,￿Univerity of Pennsylvania mimeo.
[12] Hall, R. ￿Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness,￿American Eco-
nomic Review, 95(1), pp. 50-65, 2005.
[13] Hall, R. ￿Job Loss, Job Finding, and Unemployment in the U.S. Economy over the Past
Fifty Years,￿NBER Macroeconomics Annual, pp. 101-137, 2005.
[14] Hall, R. and P. Milgrom. ￿The Limited In￿ uence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain,￿
American Economic Review, 98(4), pp. 1653-1674, 2008.
[15] Krause, M and T. Lubik. ￿The (Ir)relevance of Real Wage Rigidity in the New Keynesian
Model with Search Frictions￿ , Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(3), 2007.
[16] Mertz, M. ￿Search in the Labor Market and the Real Business Cycle,￿Journal of Monetary
Economics, 49, 2002.
[17] Mortensen, D. and E. Nagypal. ￿More on Unemployment and Vacancy Fluctuations,￿
NBER Working Papers 11692, 2005.
[18] Mortensen, D and C. Pissarides. ￿Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of
Unemployment,￿Review of Economic Studies, 61, 397-415, 1994.
[19] Pissarides, C. ￿The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage Stickiness the Answer?,￿
The Walras-Bowley lecture, North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Soci-
ety, Duke University, June 21-24, 2007
[20] Schor J., ￿Does Work Intensity Respond to Macroeconomic Variables? Evidence from
British Manufacturing,￿Working Paper, 1987.
[21] Shimer, R. ￿The Consequences of Rigid Wages in Search Models,￿Journal of the European
Economic Association (Papers and Proceedings), 2: 469-479, 2004.
24[22] Shimer, R. ￿The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies,￿Amer-
ican Economic Review, 95(1), pp. 25-49, 2005.
25Table 1: Summary Statistics, Quarterly US Data, 1951-2005
u v θ p
Standard deviation 0.125 0.139 0.257 0.010
Quarterly
autocorrelation
0.87 0.90 0.89 0.69
u 1 -0.95 -0.97 -0.23
v - 1 0.98 0.25
θ - - 1 0.19 Correlation matrix
p 1
Notes: Seasonally adjusted unemployment u is constructed by the BLS from t he Current Population Survey (CPS). The seasonally adjusted
help-wanted advertising indexv is constructed by the Conference Board.Labor market tightness is the vacanc -unemployment ratio. Average
labor productivity p is seasonally adjusted real average output per person in the non-farm business sector, constructed by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) from the National Income and Product Accounts and the Current Employment Statistics.All variables are reported in logs as
deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 1600.
Table 2: Calibration
Discount rate β=0.99
Matching function elasticity ˃=0.5
Bargaining weight γ=˃ Hosios (1990)
Probability vacancy is filled q(θ)=0.7 den Haan, Ramey and
Watson (2000)
Job finding probability θq(θ)=0.6 Thomas (2008)
Separation rate λ=0.1 Shimer (2005)
Income replacement ratio b=0.4 Shimer(2005)
Returns to scale to efficient
hours α=0.64
Disutility of hours ˃h=2
Short-run increasing returns
to hours φ=1.5 Schor (1997)
Growth rate of 2% a year a0=0.5%
Degree of price stickiness ν=0.5
(2 quarters) Bils and Klenow (2004)
Mark-up of 10% ʵ=11
AR(1) process for money
growth ρm=0.5 Krause and Lubik (2007)
Standard-deviation of
monetary policy shock ˃m=0.0226
Standard-deviation of
technology shock ˃a=0.006
26Table 3: Summary Statistics, Model



























θ - - 1 0.49
(0.08)
Correlation matrix
p - - - 1






















Degree of price stickiness ” 0.75 0.12 47%















MP(θ) is the model generated standard-deviation of labor market tightness and ￿
US(θ) is its empirical counterpart.




































































Figure 1: Impulse response functions to one s.d. shocks. Dashed lines represent the 95%
con￿dence interval.































Figure 2: Model (dotted line) and Empirical (plain line) impulse response functions to a
positive monetary policy shock. Dashed lines represent the 95% con￿dence interval.

































Figure 3: Model (dotted line) and Empirical (plain line) impulse response functions to a
positive technology shock. Dashed lines represent the 95% con￿dence interval.
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